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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS:
THE CLASH BETWEEN THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION AND THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
HARRY T. EDWARDS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1960, in three landmark decisions that have come to be known as
the Steelworkers Trilogy, ' the Supreme Court made it clear that arbitra-
tion is "a kingpin of federal labor policy ' 2 in the United States. The
Court
exalted the role of the arbitrator as a force for industrial peace, articu-
lated a view of the labor contract as a working arrangement between
labor and management engrossing unwritten understandings and plant
practices not reflected in the written terms, and announced a doctrine
of judicial self-restraint in cases in which the parties have assigned the
task of dispute resolution to an arbitrator privately selected.
3
In short, the Court proclaimed that a fundamental goal of the nation's
labor legislation is the promotion of binding arbitration as a way of
resolving disputes that arise during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement.
The policies enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy are grounded
both in economic rationality and common sense. Arbitration provides a
relatively speedy, informal and inexpensive alternative to litigation and
to economic warfare; it is therapeutic in the sense that it allows workers
to "have their day in court;" it often involves a judgment from someone
who is well known and well respected by the parties; it is a flexible pro-
cess that easily may be changed to suit the needs of the parties; and, most
importantly, it is an extension of collective bargaining - the private sys-
tem of jurisprudence created by and for the benefit of the parties. How-
ever, it has always been understood that, in order to be fully effective,
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. B.S.
1962, Cornell University; J.D. 1965, University of Michigan. This article was prepared in connec-
tion with Judge Edwards' presentation of the Kenneth M. Piper Lecture at IIT Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law, in Chicago, Illinois, on February 9, 1988. The author wishes to acknowledge the
research assistance of Jonathan D. Schwartz in the preparation of this article.
1. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3. R. GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW 551 (1976).
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arbitration must afford finality. Thus, the Supreme Court has empha-
sized time and again
that the courts play only a limited role when asked to review the deci-
sion of an arbitrator. The courts are not authorized to reconsider the
merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award
rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract .... The
federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be under-
mined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards."4
In recent years, this long-standing policy of judicial deference has
been significantly undercut by a series of lower court decisions that va-
cate arbitration awards on the ground that they conflict with public pol-
icy. In my view, these courts have engaged in unprincipled and
unwarranted judicial activism, because the awards in question did not
violate any statute, regulation or other manifestation of positive law, or
compel conduct by an employer, union or employee that would violate
such a law. Under the guise of public policy, therefore, these courts have
substituted their own views of industrial justice for the views of the
arbitrator.
A few months ago, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United
Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc. ,5 which goes a long way
toward putting an end to this alarming practice. The Court stated in no
uncertain terms that the so-called "public policy exception" should be
construed in an extremely narrow fashion, and that lower courts do not
have broad powers to vacate arbitration awards on the ground that they
purportedly violate some public policy. Regrettably, the opinion in
Misco contains several false starts and make-weights which may allow
lower courts to circumvent an otherwise unmistakable mandate from the
Supreme Court. This was made evident just two weeks after the decision
in Misco was issued, when the Eighth Circuit adopted an expansive inter-
pretation of the public policy exception that appears to ignore the basic
tenor of the Supreme Court's recent decision. 6
Judicial decisions that subscribe to a broad public policy exception
commit two fundamental errors: first, they disregard the commands of
the Steelworkers Trilogy; second, they overlook the threat that an ill-de-
fined public policy exception poses to the reciprocal duty to bargain im-
posed on employers and unions under the nation's labor laws. In most
instances when a court decides that an employer is not required to abide
4. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 370 (1987) (quoting Enter-
prise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596 (1960)).
5. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
6. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d
1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
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by an arbitral award because it allegedly conflicts with some asserted
public policy, the employer is given a free rein to act as it wishes with
regard to a term of employment covered by the duty to bargain. The
court thus effectively removes that subject from the ambit of collective
bargaining, despite the fact that the subject, and the entire grievance-
arbitration structure as well, are mandatory subjects of bargaining under
our national labor laws. This is ironic, because the offending courts
seemingly fail to recognize that, in vacating arbitration awards under a
broad public policy exception, they are infringing the explicit public pol-
icy underlying the duty to bargain.
7
II. THE RULE OF JUDICIAL NONINTERVENTION WITH LABOR
ARBITRATION
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides
that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organ-
ization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
8
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,9 the Supreme Court held
that section 301(a) "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal
law for the enforcement of ... collective bargaining agreements and in-
cludes within that federal law specific performance of promises to arbi-
trate grievances under collective bargaining agreements."' 0 Given the
legal foundation established by Lincoln Mills, the Court found it easy to
enunciate the principles of judicial nonintervention with arbitration
found in the Steelworkers Trilogy.
In order to understand the parameters of the current debate over the
public policy exception, it is important to recall the broad sweep of the
Court's holdings in the Steelworkers Trilogy. In United Steelworkers v.
7. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in another case involving the public policy
exception. United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987). It will be interesting to see whether the Court uses
this case to make it clear that an expansive public policy exception is inconsistent with the well
established and dominant public policy favoring the duty to bargain as an essential component of
labor-management relations.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
9. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court's "love affair with arbitration," J. ATLESON, VALUES AND
ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 182 n. 10 (1983), first blossomed in Lincoln Mills.
10. 353 U.S. at 451.
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Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,'" the Court observed that a collective
bargaining agreement, unlike a typical business contract, is a "genera-
lized code," 12 given "the breadth of the matters covered, as well as the
need for a fairly concise and readable instrument."' 3 The agreement is
augmented, moreover, by "the common law of a particular industry or of
a particular plant."' 4 When disputes inevitably arise as to the agree-
ment's application and interpretation, arbitration is the "vehicle by
which [the agreement is given] meaning and content."' 5 These griev-
ance-arbitration procedures, the Court explained, are "at the very heart
of the system of industrial self-government."'
6
The Court further noted that the judiciary's limited task "in these
cases [is] to bring into operation [a] . . . process which substitutes a re-
gime of peaceful settlement for the older regime of industrial confict."' 7
Thus, in United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,18 the
Court stated that the courts "have no business weighing the merits of [a]
grievance," since "[t]he agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitra-
tion, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious."' 9 And in
Warrior & Gulf, the Court pointed out that there is a strong presumption
of arbitrability when questions arise over whether certain issues are sub-
ject to arbitration. In the Court's words, "[d]oubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage."
'20
In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. ,21 moreover,
the Court stressed that lower courts must exercise considerable self-re-
straint in reviewing an arbitrator's award under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act;22 their inquiry normally should be limited to
ascertaining simply whether the award "draws its essence from the col-
lective bargaining agreement."'23 The Court cautioned that, even when
presented with an ambiguous decision by an arbitrator, judges lack au-
thority to second-guess his decision: "[i]t is the arbitrator's construction
11. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
12. Id. at 578.
13. Id. at 580.
14. Id. at 579.
15. Id. at 581; see also Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 225 (1983).
16. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581.
17. Id. at 585; cf. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962) ("The
ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process of free and voluntary collective
bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace.").
18. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
19. Id. at 568.
20. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 583.
21. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
23. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
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which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns
construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him
because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."' 24
Very recently, in Misco, the Court strongly reaffirmed its continuing
support for the highly deferential standard of review set forth in Enter-
prise Wheel:
Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbi-
trator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view
of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to
accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error
by an arbitrator .... The arbitrator may not ignore the plain langage
of the contract; but the parties having authorized the arbitrator to give
meaning to the language of the agreement, a court should not reject an
award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract. So, too,
where it is contemplated that the arbitrator will determine remedies
for contract violations that he finds, courts have no authority to disa-
gree with his honest judgment in that respect. If the courts were free to
intervene on these grounds, the speedy resolution of grievances by pri-
vate mechanisms would be greatly undermined .... [A]s long as the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and act-
ing within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he com-
mitted serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.25
In short, then, courts do not possess "unbridled authority to review the
correctness of an arbitrator's decision."
'26
The foregoing passage indicates, however, that the judiciary may be
called upon to review an arbitration award in the rare case where an
arbitrator has allegedly exceeded his authority under the collective bar-
gaining agreement, thus basing the award on his "own notions of indus-
trial justice."' 27  This limited exception to the rule of judicial
nonintervention makes perfect sense. As Professor St. Antoine has
noted, the existence of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement indicates that an employer and a union have chosen to employ
an arbitrator as their "contract reader," such that he is authorized to
render binding interpretations of the agreement. 28  In construing the
agreement, the arbitrator may certainly "look for guidance from many
sources,"' 29 including the common law of the shop. But, an arbitrator
who ignores the contract and interjects his own values into the decision-
24. Id. at 599.
25. 108 S. Ct. at 370-71 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
26. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
27. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 371.
28. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1977).
29. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
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making process exceeds his authority and thus abdicates his special role
as "contract reader" for the parties. Likewise, arbitral awards "procured
by the parties through fraud or through the arbitrator's dishonesty need
not be enforced,"30 since in these situations, too, the arbitrator will not
fulfill his limited role as "contract reader" for the parties.
For the most part, the courts have refused to allow these limited
exceptions to swallow the rule of nonintervention. 31 Indeed, each year,
literally thousands of arbitration cases are processed and awards are im-
plemented without challenge from the parties or interference by the
courts. Only infrequently do courts find that particular arbitration
awards did not draw their essence from the contract or were rendered in
circumstances indicating some type of "bad faith."' 32 Moreover, in those
''very rare instances when an arbitrator's procedural aberrations rise to
the level of affirmative misconduct, ' 33 the Supreme Court has insisted
that the lower courts.resist the temptation to "settl[e] the merits accord-
ing to [their] own judgment. ' 34 Instead, they are required simply to va-
cate the award and remand for further arbitral proceedings if permitted
by the agreement. In this way, the courts continue to hew to a policy of
nonintervention to the greatest extent possible.
III. THE BURGEONING PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of
United Rubber Workers,3 5 the Supreme Court for the first time had to
decide under what circumstances a court could refuse to enforce an arbi-
tration award on the ground that it violates some public policy. The
Court began by noting that public policy issues are "ultimately ... for
resolution by the courts,"3 6 and thus are not left to the sole discretion of
the arbitrator. However, the only occasion for not enforcing an award on
public policy grounds would be when the collective bargaining agreement
"as interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates some explicit public policy."' 37
An "explicit" public policy, the Court explained,
must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained "by refer-
ence to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considera-
30. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 371.
31. See generally Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, in DECISIONAL THINKING OF
ARBITRATORS AND JUDGES 331, Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting, National Acad-
emy of Arbitrators (1981).
32. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 372.
33. Id. at 372 n.10.
34. Id.
35. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
36. Id. at 766.
37. Id.
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tions of supposed public interests." '38
By formulating the exception in this manner, the Court clearly intended
to limit severely the possibility of potentially intrusive judicial review
under the guise of public policy.
The narrow scope of the public policy exception is also evident from
the Court's disposition of the employer's contentions in W.R. Grace. The
case involved an arbitration award that required an employer to recom-
pense employees who had been laid off from work in violation of the
seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. The employer
had departed from the seniority procedures in order to comply with a
court-approved conciliation agreement between it and the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission; under the conciliation agreement,
the company was required to maintain the existing percentage of women
in employment during any reductions in the work force. The employer
instituted an action to overturn the award, claiming that compliance
would be inconsistent with the public policy favoring "obedience to judi-
cial orders."'
39
The Supreme Court disagreed and enforced the arbitrator's award,
even though the asserted public policy was unquestionably "well defined
and dominant." The Court pointed out that, although the award and the
conciliation agreement were certainly in some tension, the former did not
mandate "that layoffs be conducted according to the collective-bargain-
ing agreement. The award simply held, retrospectively, that the employ-
ees were entitled to damages." 4 Moreover, the employer's "dilemma...
was of [its] own making," since it had "committed itself voluntarily to
two conflicting contractual obligations."'4 1 W.R. Grace thus stands for
the proposition that the public policy in question not only must be "well
defined and dominant," but also must be in sharp conflict with the arbi-
trator's award.
42
38. Id. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). In Muschany, the Court
continued:
As the term "public policy" is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law of
the sovereignty to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy. It is a
matter of public importance that good faith contracts ... should not be lightly invalidated.
Only dominant public policy would justify such action.
324 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted).
39. 461 U.S. at 766.
40. Id. at 768-69.
41. Id. at 767.
42. The employer also claimed that the arbitrator's decision conflicted with the public policy
favoring "[v]oluntary compliance with Title VII." Id. at 770. In rejecting this argument, the Court
acknowledged that the asserted public policy was well established. Nonetheless, the Court pointed
out that the conciliation agreement between the employer and the EEOC was reached without the
union's consent, and was therefore contrary to "the federal labor policy that parties to a collective-
1988]
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It is critical to recognize that in W.R. Grace the Court limited its
inquiry to whether the award itself violated some explicit public policy or
compelled conduct that violated such a policy. Indeed, the Court noted
at two junctures that the precise question presented was whether the col-
lective bargaining agreement "as interpreted by [the arbitrator]"43 trans-
gressed some explicit public policy. The Court did not, therefore,
consider the merits of the employees' underlying grievances. Viewed in
this light, the Court's decision represents nothing "more or different than
what the courts have said over the years in construing Enterprise
Wheel."44
Prior to W.R. Grace, most courts limited the public policy inquiry
to whether the award itself violated established law or sought to compel
some clearly unlawful action.45 For example, 25 years ago the Second
Circuit had to consider whether an arbitration award reinstating a con-
victed gambler - who had been fired for breaking the employer's rule
prohibiting gambling at work - violated public policy. 46 The applicable
collective bargaining agreement gave the employer the right to discharge
employees for "just cause," and the union the right to challenge the ap-
propriateness of the employer's decision through binding arbitration.
Citing a series of mitigating factors, an arbitrator decided that discharge
was too harsh a punishment, and ordered the employer to reinstate the
employee without backpay or the accrual of seniority. Two different dis-
trict court judges refused to enforce the award. They claimed that the
award violated "overriding public policy," since it would "indulge[ ]
bargaining agreement must have reasonable assurance that their contract will be honored." Id. at
771.
Furthermore, the Court noted that enforcement of the arbitrator's award would promote con-
ciliation and compliance with federal anti-discrimination laws:
If, as in this case, only the employer faces Title VII liability, the union may enter the
conciliation process with the hope of obtaining concessions in exchange for helping the
employer avoid a Title VII suit. If, however, both the union and the employer are poten-
tially liable, it would be in their joint interests to work out a means to share the burdens
imposed by the Commission's demands.
Id. at 771-72.
43. Id. at 766, 768 (emphasis added).
44. American Postal Workers Union, 789 F.2d at 8.
45. See, e.g., Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, Local
112, 687 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); American Postal Workers
Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200
(1983); Amalgamated Transit Union Local Div. 1309 v. Aztec Bus Lines, 654 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.
1981) (per curiam); General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard Brands, 579 F.2d 1282
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979); International Ass'n of Machinists,
Dist. No. 8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820 (1969).
46. Local 453, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963), cited in W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
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crime" and "cripple[ ] [the] employer's power to support the law." 47
In reversing the decisions below, then-Judge Thurgood Marshall,
writing for a unanimous panel which included Judges Friendly and
Kaufman, first noted that the arbitrator's decision fell well within the
bounds of his authority under the collective bargaining agreement. He
also noted that the employer should have sought an explicit exclusion
from the "just cause" provision in the collective bargaining agreement if
it had wanted an unencumbered right to discharge employees who broke
the company's rules on gambling. He recognized, however, that the
power to enforce arbitration awards was " 'at all times exercised subject
to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the United
States,' "48 and that the penal law under which the employee had been
convicted conclusively established that there was a distinct public policy
against gambling at work.
Judge Marshall concluded, nonetheless, that the proper inquiry was
not whether there was a public policy against gambling at work, but
whether there was a public policy against the reinstatement of someone
who had been convicted for gambling at work - the precise award made
by the arbitrator. In answering this question in the negative, he said:
[The public] policy [against gambling at work] has been vindicated...
in the very manner that the State of New York contemplated, by a
criminal conviction and the judicial imposition of a penalty.... There
is no federal policy that requires greater vindication of the public con-
demnation of gambling than this. The law is not that Draconian....
Moreover, in light of the important role which employment plays
in implementing the public policy of rehabilitating those convicted of
crime, there can hardly be a public policy that a man who has been
convicted, fined, and subjected to serious disciplinary measures, can
never be ordered reinstated to his former employment .. .49
Judge Marshall emphasized that his opinion should not be interpreted as
a condonation of the employee's misconduct. That was beside the point.
Having bargained for the arbitrator's determination of whether the em-
ployee's gambling constituted "just cause" for discharge under the col-
lective bargaining agreement, the employer was obligated to implement
the award.
47. Otis Elevator, 314 F.2d at 27 (quoting Local 453, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Otis
Elevator Co., 201 F.Supp. 213, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)).
48. 314 F.2d at 29 (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948)).
49. 314 F.2d at 29. The court also rejected the wholly fallacious argument that reinstating the
employee could have potentially subjected the employer to prosecution under a penal law which
made it a criminal offense for an employer knowingly to condone or assist in the sale of lottery
-policies" on his premises. Given that the employer had sought to discharge the employee for his
actions and had warned him against such conduct in the future, it could hardly be said that the
employer would be found to have violated the statute. See id.
1988]
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Even though W.R. Grace (and most lower court decisions antedat-
ing it) restricted the inquiry to whether the award itself was contrary to
public policy, several courts of appeals concluded in the wake of W.R.
Grace that the public policy exception is not so limited. In United States
Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union,5o for example, the First
Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration award requiring the reinstate-
ment of a postal employee who had been convicted of embezzling postal
funds. The court believed that enforcing the award would violate the
public policies "'against embezzlement of Government money' "51 and
in favor of the prompt delivery of the mails. In reaching this decision,
the court did not dispute the fact that there was no legal proscription
whatsoever against the Postal Service's employment of a convicted em-
bezzler. It was clear, moreover, that the Postal Service had freely negoti-
ated the "just cause" and arbitration clauses in the parties' collective
bargaining agreement and was free to bargain for their alteration or re-
moval in the future.
5 2
A similar result was reached by the Fifth Circuit in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, Local 540 v. Great Western Food Co. ,3 where an arbitrator
ordered a trucking company to reinstate a driver who admitted that he
had been drinking shortly before an accident in which his truck over-
turned. The court refused to enforce the award, which it deemed con-
trary to "the public policy of preventing people from drinking and
driving [as] embodied in the case law, the applicable regulations, statu-
tory law, and pure common sense."5 4 The court failed to note, however,
that there was nothing in the award itself which ran afoul of this other-
wise commendable public policy.
The Seventh Circuit joined these ranks in E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Grasselli Employees Independent Association,5 5 where an arbitra-
tor ordered the reinstatement of an employee who had suffered a mental
breakdown at the employer's plant and subsequently assaulted other em-
ployees and destroyed company property. Although the court enforced
50. 736 F.2d 822 (lst Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 824 (quoting from the decision below).
52. See also S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178
(1st Cir.) (refusing to enforce award reinstating employees who had been discharged for selling mari-
juana at the employer's plant on the ground that it violated the public policy against a safe work-
place), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 497 (1987).
53. 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983). But cf. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Local 4-228 v. Union
Oil Co., 818 F.2d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Whether [the employee's] post-award drug use renders
enforcement of her reinstatement award against public policy presents an issue that should be re-
solved by the arbitrator, not the court.").
54. 712 F.2d at 125.
55. 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 186 (1986).
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the award because the arbitrator found that the likelihood of recurrence
was remote, it explicitly rejected the standard urged by the union - that
the contract as construed by the arbitrator must violate some positive law
before a court may bar its enforcement.
5 6
The foregoing decisions of the First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits are
in clear conflict with decisions issued by those circuits that have contin-
ued to give the public policy exception a narrow compass. In American
Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,"7 for example, the
District of Columbia Circuit enforced an arbitration award which called
for the reinstatement of a postal employee who had admitted that he
converted postal funds to his own use.58 In rejecting the Postal Service's
argument that reinstating the employee would be contrary to public pol-
icy, the court stated:
[C]ourts will not enforce an arbitration award if the award itself vio-
lates established law or seeks to compel some unlawful action. How-
ever, this rule, which is sometimes referred to as a public policy
exception, is extremely narrow....
... [I]t is plain from the language in W.R. Grace itself that the
Court meant to say only that an arbitration award may not be enforced
if it transgresses "well defined" and "dominant" "laws and legal prece-
dents." It is also clear from the opinion in W.R. Grace that judges
56. See id. at 616. But cf. UAW v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 793 F.2d 810 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 403 (1986) (citing W.R. Grace, court enforces award requiring employer to make
annual pension contribution as called for in pension agreement with union, despite the fact that
Internal Revenue Service had granted the employer a waiver from statutory obligation to make
minimum contribution).
57. 789 F.d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that I
authored the .unanimous panel decisions in American Postal Workers Union and Northwest Airlines
v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3678
(U.S. Mar. 26, 1987) (No. 86-1548). In addition, I joined the per curiam decision in United States
Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
500 (1987). In each of these cases the court held that the arbitrator's award must violate positive law
or otherwise compel conduct in violation of such a law for a court to deny enforcement. While I was
not a member of the panel in United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 789
F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam), that decision, too, adopts a narrow view of the public policy
exception.
58. The employee acknowledged this after being interrogated by federal law enforcement of-
ficers. The judge presiding over his criminal trial suppressed the statements he made to these of-
ficers, since he had not been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The employee was subsequently acquitted.
The arbitrator also refused to consider these inculpatory statements, claiming that he was enti-
tled to consider the fact that the Postal Service had agreed in the collective bargaining agreement to
comply with " 'applicable laws.'" American Postal Workers Union, 789 F.2d at 3 (quoting from the
agreement). Having excluded the employer's primary evidence of misconduct, the arbitrator thus
overturned the employer's discharge and reduced the punishment to a long disciplinary suspension
without back pay.
In reversing the trial court's vacation of the arbitrator's award, the court of appeals, citing the
Steelworkers Trilogy, concluded that the arbitrator's decision clearly drew its essence from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. It was immaterial, in this connection, that the arbitrator may have made
a mistake of law, since the parties had bargained for his reading of the contract. See id. at 4-8.
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have no license to impose their own brand of justice in determining
applicable public policy; thus, the exception applies only when the
public policy emanates from clear statutory or case law, "not from gen-
eral considerations of supposed public interests."59
The public policy exception, as thus understood by the court, could not
successfully be invoked by the Postal Service:
The arbitrator's award was not itself unlawful, for there is no legal
proscription against the reinstatement of a person such as the grievant.
And the award did not otherwise have the effect of mandating any
illegal conduct....
... For us to embrace the employer's argument here would be to
run the risk of allowing an ill-defined "public policy" exception to
swallow the rule in favor of judicial deference to arbitration. We will
not endorse any such blatant disregard of the teachings of Enterprise
Wheel and W.R. Grace.6°
The Ninth Circuit embraced an analogous interpretation of W.R.
Grace in its decision in Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986,61 where an
arbitrator had ordered the reinstatement of two employees who had been
discharged after their employer learned that they were undocumented
aliens. The court rejected the employer's contention that the arbitrator's
award was contrary to the public policy against the employment of un-
documented aliens. While such individuals had no legal right to be in the
country, the court pointed out that no federal law in force at the time
forbade the employer from hiring them. Similarly, the employer could
not rely on a state statute that purportedly did so, since its enforcement
had been enjoined pending a review of its constitutionality. 62 The Ninth
Circuit was thus unwilling to deny enforcement absent a distinct and
present conflict with positive law.
63
59. 789 F.2d at 8 (quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766) (emphasis in original).
60. 789 F.2d at 8-9. The court also pointed out that, even if the arbitrator's understanding of
the employee's Fifth Amendment rights was incorrect, the decision to exclude his statements from
consideration was not unlawful and it did not require the employer to violate the law. See supra note
58; cf Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 135 v. Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234,
1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("an award will not be vacated even though the arbitrator may have made, in
the eyes of judges, errors of fact and law unless it 'compels the violation of law or conduct contrary
to accepted public policy' ") (quoting Gulf States Tel. Co. v. Local 1692, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
416 F.2d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1969)).
61. 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987).
62. See id. at 1392-93 ("We hold that the arbitrator's award of reinstatement and backpay
notwithstanding the immigration status of the employees neither violates a clearly defined public
policy nor is in manifest disregard of the law. Neither the company nor its employees are subject to
any criminal or civil liability ....") (footnote omitted).
63. The Third Circuit appears to adhere to a narrow interpretation of the public policy excep-
tion as well. In Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, Local
112, 687 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983), an arbitrator ordered the
reinstatement of an employee who, in sub-zero temperatures, cut off the gas supply to an entire
borough. The court refused to deny enforcement, noting that the employer did not bring to its
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Because W.R. Grace inexplicably engendered this split in the cir-
cuits, the Supreme Court received several petitions for certiorari request-
ing it to put the public policy dispute to rest. In its recent decision in
Misco, the Court, although not settling the question once and for all,
strongly suggested that the narrow interpretation of the public policy ex-
ception is the correct one.
IV. MISCO AND THE NARROW VIEW OF THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION
In January, 1983, Isiah Cooper was arrested by the police in the
parking lot of Misco, Inc.'s paper plant in Monroe, Louisiana. He had
been sitting in the back seat of a car in which there was found a lighted
marijuana cigarette in the ashtray of the right front door and marijuana
smoke in the air. The car was not owned by Cooper, and two other Misco
employees were seen leaving the vehicle just prior to Cooper's arrest. A
few weeks later, Misco fired Cooper for allegedly violating a company
rule against the possession or use of drugs on company property. Pursu-
ant to the applicable collective bargaining agreement, Cooper's union
filed a grievance on his behalf, claiming that Misco did not have "just
cause" to fire him. After efforts to resolve the grievance failed, the dis-
pute was submitted to arbitration.
In sustaining the grievance and ordering that Cooper be reinstated
with backpay and full seniority, the arbitrator concluded that Misco
failed to prove that Cooper had actually violated the company rule. In
the arbitrator's view, "finding Cooper in the backseat of a car and a burn-
ing cigarette in the front-seat ashtray was insufficient proof that Cooper
was using or possessed marijuana on company property." 64 The arbitra-
"attention any federal or state law that would compel the harsher sanction of discharge, no doubt
because no such law exists." Id. at 682.
After W.R. Grace was decided, the Third Circuit faced the public policy issue again in Super
Tire Eng'g Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 817 (1984). In that case, an arbitrator ordered the reinstatement of an employee who had been
fired for drinking during work hours. The court, citing both W.R. Grace and its earlier decision in
Kane, refused to set aside the award, since the employee's "reinstatement conflicts with no law or
well-defined policy." Id. at 125 n.6. However, the court further observed that "[tihere was no
evidence that [the employee] poses a threat to fellow workers or society." Id. This dictum suggests
that this panel of the court might have countenanced a broader interpretation of the public policy
exception.
The Sixth Circuit, without issuing a written opinion, recently affirmed a district court decision
enforcing an arbitrator's award in the face of a public policy challenge. The trial court, however,
cited with apparent approval some of the recent decisions of the First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.
Premium Bldg. Prods. Co. v. United Steelworkers, 616 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ohio 1985), afld without
opinion, 798 F.2d 1415 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, at least before Misco was decided, the view of the
Sixth Circuit was somewhat unclear. See infra note 119.
64. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 369 (summarizing the findings of the arbitrator).
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tor refused to consider evidence that the police had also discovered mari-
juana in Cooper's car on the same day that he was arrested, since Misco
had not been aware of this fact at the time he was discharged. Indeed,
Misco did not learn of the marijuana in Cooper's car until a few days
before the arbitrator held a hearing approximately eight months later.
Misco filed suit in district court, seeking to vacate the award on
several grounds. One argument was that compelling Cooper's reinstate-
ment would be contrary to the public policy purportedly favoring the
safe operation of dangerous machinery. 65 Misco pointed out that Cooper
had operated a machine that cut rolling coils of paper with sharp blades.
The district court agreed with Misco, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, rul-
ing that reinstatement would violate the public policy "against the opera-
tion of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or
alcohol."'66 In addition, the court held that the arbitrator improperly
refused to consider evidence that marijuana had been found in Cooper's
car. Even without this evidence, the court noted, the arbitrator commit-
ted serious error in finding that the circumstances surrounding Cooper's
arrest did not establish that Cooper had violated the company rule.
Before reaching the public policy issues, a unanimous Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice White, forcefully reaffirmed the deferen-
tial standard of review applicable in all cases in which courts are called
upon to review an arbitrator's award under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.67 Under this standard, the Court had little
trouble concluding that the Fifth Circuit erred in second-guessing the
arbitrator's evidentiary ruling, not the least because it was common prac-
tice for arbitrators to restrict their inquiry "to the facts known to the
employer at the time of the discharge." 68 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit
overstepped its authority in deciding that the evidence with regard to
Cooper's arrest established that Cooper had actually violated the com-
pany rule. As the Court put it: "No dishonesty [on the part of the arbi-
trator] is alleged; only improvident, even silly, factfinding is claimed.
This is hardly sufficient basis for disregarding what the agent appointed
by the parties determined to be the historical facts."'69 The Court further
noted that, "[e]ven if it were open to the Court of Appeals to have found
a violation [of company rules] because of the marijuana found in
65. Misco also claimed that Cooper's reinstatement would be contrary to the public policy
against drug use.
66. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1985).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
68. 108 S. Ct. at 371 n.8.
69. Id. at 371.
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Cooper's car," deference to an arbitrator's decision is particularly appro-
priate " 'when it comes to formulating remedies.' "70
With respect to the public policy contentions, the Court first re-
viewed the legal principles enunciated in W.R. Grace. In so doing, it
made clear that its decision in that case was not meant to herald an ex-
pansive interpretation of the public policy exception:
[W.R. Grace] does not.., sanction a broad judicial power to set aside
arbitration awards as against public policy. Although we discussed the
effect of [the arbitrator's] award on two broad areas of public policy,
our decision turned on our examination of whether the award created
any explicit conflict with other "laws and legal precedents" rather than
an assessment of "general considerations of supposed public
interests."
7 1
This short but critical passage reveals that the Court's public policy in-
quiry appears to have two distinct parts. A court should first ascertain
whether the asserted public policy is well established in the positive law,
i.e., statutes, regulations or case law. If no such public policy is found to
exist, the inquiry is over. If, on the other hand, the court discovers a well
established public policy, it should then ask whether "the award created
any explicit conflict" with that policy.
72
The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's public policy analysis because
it utterly failed to satisfy the first part of this two-part test. In the
Court's view, the Fifth Circuit "made no attempt to review existing laws
and legal precedents in order to demonstrate that they establish a 'well
defined and dominant' policy against the operation of dangerous machin-
ery while under the influence of drugs."' 73 While the Court recognized
that this purported public policy was well grounded in common sense, it
stressed that such generalized considerations would not suffice when set-
ting aside an award which derived from an otherwise valid collective bar-
gaining agreement. "At the very least," the Court stated, "an alleged
public policy must be properly framed under the approach set out in
WR. Grace."
' 74
The Court proceeded, nonetheless, to find other faults in the Fifth
Circuit's public policy analysis. The Court first noted that, even if the
purported public policy against the operation of dangerous machinery
under the influence of drugs were well grounded in the positive law,
Misco had not clearly shown that this policy had been violated in this
70. Id. at 372 (quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597) (emphasis in original).
71. 108 S. Ct. at 373 (quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766).
72. 108 S. Ct. at 373 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 374.
74. Id. at 373.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
case: "the assumed connection between the marijuana gleanings found in
Cooper's car and Cooper's actual use of drugs in the workplace [was]
tenuous at best."' 75 Furthermore, in drawing the inference that Cooper
had violated or would violate the alleged public policy, the Fifth Circuit
had engaged in impermissible fact-finding. The Court stressed that fac-
tual determinations are the sole province of the arbitrator, even when a
court is inquiring into a possible violation of public policy.
76
These remarks are certainly consistent with the Court's long-held
view that the judiciary has only a very circumscribed role to play in re-
viewing an arbitrator's award. But, they are also potentially misleading
in that they could be read to suggest that Misco would have prevailed if
the arbitrator had determined that Cooper had actually operated danger-
ous machinery while under the influence of drugs and if the public policy
proscribing that behavior were well defined and dominant. The problem,
of course, is that even if both of these things had been proven, there was
nothing in the arbitrator's award that would have violated this public
policy. The arbitrator merely ordered Misco to reinstate Cooper, and,
apparently, there was no legal proscription against the employment or
reinstatement of someone in Cooper's position.
That the focus is properly directed to whether the arbitrator's
award, as opposed to the underlying behavior which led to Cooper's dis-
missal, violated some public policy is evident from the language the
Court employed in describing the contours of the public policy excep-
tion. As noted above, the Court stressed that the exception was only
intended to cover situations in which "the award created any explicit
conflict" 77 with some well established public policy. The Court put it
another way when it noted that in W.R. Grace it had "cautioned... that
a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of [collective
bargaining] contracts is limited to situations where the contract as inter-
preted would violate 'some explicit public policy.' "78 In this case, the
arbitrator interpreted the agreement to allow Cooper's reinstatement
under the specific circumstances presented. In other words, the arbitra-
tor "read" the agreement to provide that the mere presence of an em-
ployee in a car where marijuana was found did not constitute "just
cause" for discharge.
75. Id. at 374. The Court noted that it was proper for the Fifth Circuit to consider the fact that
marijuana had been found in Cooper's car in pursuing its public policy inquiry. Id.
76. Id. The Court thus rejected the suggestion made by the Seventh Circuit in E.L DuPont de
Nemours, 790 F.2d at 617, that courts applying the public policy exception owe less deference to an
arbitrator's factual findings.
77. 108 S. Ct. at 373 (emphasis added).
78. Id. (latter emphasis added).
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There was nothing surprising about the arbitrator's decision in
Misco, and it surely did not violate any explicit public policy. This is best
understood with the realization that the employer in Misco was not re-
quired to fire Cooper for his alleged acts of misconduct; in other words, if
Misco had elected not to discharge Cooper (even knowing positively that
Cooper was guilty of misconduct), no laws or regulations "would [have
stood] in the way."'79 The same point held true when the arbitrator in
Misco ruled that the employer could not fire Cooper under the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. In either case, no public policy is in-
fringed; there may be a general public policy against marijuana use, but
the law does not prohibit the employment of persons like Cooper.
Along these same lines, Justice Blackmun noted in his concurring
opinion, which was joined by Justice Brennan, that
framing . . .an alleged public policy under the approach set out in
W.R. Grace would [not] be sufficient to justify a court's refusal to en-
force an arbitration award on public policy grounds. Rather, I under-
stand the Court to hold that such compliance is merely a necessary
step if an award is not to be enforced.80
The concurrence seems to highlight the point that, even though an em-
ployee's conduct may be against public policy, it does not follow that an
arbitrator's award reinstating that employee is similarly violative of that
public policy. But, having disposed of the case on the ground that the
Fifth Circuit did not even attempt to see whether the asserted public
policy was in fact well established, the Court in Misco did not have to
decide if a lower court "may refuse to enforce an award on public policy
grounds only when the award itself violates" positive law.
8
1
The Supreme Court was not completely silent on the question
whether the award in question violated the public policy relied upon by
the Fifth Circuit. Because the award gave Misco the option of placing
Cooper in another job for which he was qualified, the Court noted that
Cooper would not necessarily operate dangerous machinery in the future,
thus creating the possibility of another breach of the asserted public pol-
icy.8 2 This observation, unfortunately, is another false lead, for the Court
could not possibly have meant to license lower courts to speculate as to
whether reinstatement to certain jobs is more or less likely to result in a
future violation of some purported public policy. Instead, the Court was
again merely highlighting another deficiency in the Fifth Circuit's public
79. El. DuPont de Nemnours, 790 F.2d at 619 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
80. 108 S. Ct. at 376 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 374 n.12.
82. See id. at 374.
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policy rationale. It would appear, then, that the Court would have
reached the same result even if the arbitrator had found that Cooper
smoked marijuana on the job and had ordered Misco to return him to his
former job, since apparently there is nothing in any statutes, regulations
or case law which rendered Cooper's reinstatement unlawful.
V. AN UNCERTAIN RIDE ON AN UNRULY HORSE
The English courts recognized over 150 years ago that public policy
"is a very unruly horse, and.., once you get astride it you never know
where it will carry you."'8 3 The Eighth Circuit's decision in Iowa Electric
Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers,8 4 which was issued just two weeks after Misco, confirms
the wisdom of our common law brethren.
Iowa Electric is another case about a bargaining unit employee who
challenged his dismissal in arbitration. In order to beat the noontime
lunch crowd, a nuclear power plant machinist deliberately defeated the
interlock system that kept the plant's secondary containment area pres-
surized. This area is kept pressurized in order to arrest the spread of
radiation in the unlikely event that it leaks from the primary contain-
ment area around the nuclear core. The employee was discharged for
violating the company safety rule proscribing his conduct, but an arbitra-
tor subsequently reinstated him under the "just cause" provision in the
applicable collective bargaining agreement. The employer then suc-
ceeded in having the award vacated in the district court. In affirming the
decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that "returning [the employee] to
work would violate the public policy of this nation concerning strict
compliance with safety regulations at nuclear facilities."85
It should be noted at the outset that this case is distinguishable from
Misco in at least two important ways. First, the Eighth Circuit, unlike the
Fifth Circuit, did not rely on generalized notions of presumed public in-
terests in framing the public policy it relied upon. Instead, it pointed to
statutes, regulations and court precedent which demonstrated that the
company's safety rule was an integral part of "a strict regulatory scheme
devised by Congress for the protection of the public from the hazards of
nuclear radiation."' 86 Second, there was no doubt that the employee vio-
83. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).
84. 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 1426.
86. Id. at 1428. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") has promulgated regulations
governing the operation of all nuclear power plants. Under these regulations, each operator must
develop its own detailed safety rules in order to obtain and maintain its federal license to operate a
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lated the company rule and, moreover, the asserted public policy when
he defeated the interlock system. It is also worth noting that the court in
Iowa Electric conceded that the arbitrator had acted within his authority
in ordering the employee's reinstatement.
The points that distinguish Iowa Electric make it appear to be
harder than Misco, where the Court had several alternative grounds on
which to criticize the Fifth Circuit's decision. Here, the public policy
question was clear - could the court consider the employee's past and
possible future conduct in applying the public policy exception, or was it
bound to limit its inquiry to whether the arbitrator's award itself was
illegal? In choosing the former course, the court expressly disregarded
the union's contention "that there is no 'well defined and dominant' pub-
lic policy specifying that workers who violate secondary containment at
nuclear power plants must be fired" 87 or, for that matter, cannot be
rehired.
The Eighth Circuit believed that it was complying with Misco be-
cause the employee in this case had undeniably violated a well estab-
lished public policy. But this simply cannot be the guiding principle; if it
were, a court could vacate an arbitration award reinstating an employee
who had clearly violated any one of the innumerable laws and regula-
tions proscribing different types.of conduct in society. For example, a
court might find a breach of public policy for a failure to pay child sup-
port, or a traffic violation, or a delinquent income tax payment, or an
extra-marital affair, to cite but a few absurd possibilities. These examples
are absurd in part because the "illegal" conduct cited rarely will be job-
related. But, under the reasoning of Iowa Electric, it is not clear why
that should matter - for that case can be read to stand for the proposi-
tion that a court can vacate an arbitrator's award whenever the em-
ployee's underlying conduct violates a public policy, whether or not the
conduct is job-related.
Even if the court in Iowa Electric intends a job-relatedness caveat,
from what authority is this limitation drawn, and who determines its
application? A court that claims that it will only vacate awards when the
underlying behavior is safety-related, to give but one example, is neces-
sarily imposing its own views of industrial justice, since it is entirely un-
plant. Violations of these rules must be reported to the NRC, which responds by issuing enforce-
ment penalties against the offending facility. Here, the employee violated a specific company rule
regarding secondary containment, and the NRC formally reprimanded the company. It is only in
this sense, then, that the employee violated federal regulations. See id. The NRC apparently has no
regulation requiring a company to fire an employee who violates a safety rule.
87. Id. at 1427.
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clear what conduct should be included within that amorphous term.
Moreover, it is not for the courts to decide that safety is a relevant crite-
ria for reviewing arbitral awards.
The problem, in short, is that there are no limiting principles once a
court chooses to look past the legality of the arbitrator's award to the
nature of the underlying conduct at issue. The Eighth Circuit's protesta-
tions to the contrary are particularly revealing in this regard:
Our holding today should not be read as a blanket justification for the
discharge of every employee who breaches a public safety regulation at
a nuclear power plant. There may be circumstances under which a
violation might be excused. But in this case, [the employee's] violation
of the safety rule was serious. Nor, as the Union contends, was it an
unknowing violation.... [The employee's] call to the control room for
permission to defuse the system demonstrates that he knew the inter-
lock was important.88
This ruling reflects an astonishing disregard of the teachings of the Steel-
workers Trilogy; the court in Iowa Electric not only engages in impermis-
sible factfinding, but also informs us that, in some future case, it might
choose to enforce an award reinstating an employee who was fired for
inadvertently defeating the interlock system, since that breach would be
unknowing. Likewise, the court says that it might uphold the reinstate-
ment of an employee fired for defeating the interlock system of the terti-
ary rather than the secondary containment system (assuming for the sake
of argument that one exists), since that breach would not be as serious or
important. This application of the public policy exception is simply un-
tenable. In the proverbial next case, only the court will know whether
the arbitrator's award violated public policy. The court admits as much
when it states that it will determine the "circumstances under which a
[safety] violation might be excused."' 89 To guide its decision-making, the
court presumably will abide by some amorphous serious/knowing/im-
portant "standard" that will be given content by the judges themselves
on a case-by-case basis.
It is easy to sympathize with the view of the Eighth Circuit in Iowa
Electric; most people share a natural concern about nuclear safety. But
this really is beside the point, because there is no necessary connection
between the discharge of the employee in Iowa Electric and improved
safety at the plant. Indeed, there was no law or regulation compelling the
employee's dismissal. If the Eighth Circuit's view is correct, one won-
ders why the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has failed to issue regula-
88. Id. at 1429-30 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 1429.
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tions mandating dismissal of employees like the grievant in Iowa
Electric9" or why Congress has failed to amend the National Labor Rela-
tions Act to remove the issue of "safety" at nuclear power plants from
the subjects encompassed within the duty to bargain.91 The point is that
it is virtually impossible to square the holding of Iowa Electric with the
principles enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy, W.R. Grace and Misco.
The Supreme Court has told us that the courts have no business over-
turning an arbitration award unless it conflicts with some explicit public
policy, and there was no such conflict in Iowa Electric.
There is little difference between the limiting principles - if one can
call them that - adopted by the Eighth Circuit and those adopted by
courts of similar ilk. For example, the First Circuit stated in United
States Postal Service that, in analyzing the employer's public policy con-
tentions, it would consider "the common sense implications that [rein-
statement] would have on other ...employees and on the public in
general" 92 and on the postal service's "mandate of efficiency." '93 The
Seventh Circuit took matters one step further in E.. DuPont de
Nemours. In that case, the court refers to the "legal standard regarding
the public policy exception" that it "stated, ' 94 but one looks in vain for
the place in which the court gives that standard any content. These
courts have charted a dangerous course, for the expansive public policy
exception they embrace lacks ascertainable limits and provides a conve-
nient vehicle through which judges can impose their own "general con-
siderations of supposed public interests." 95 These decisions, moreover,
provide malleable precedent for future courts seeking to overturn what
they deem to be disagreeable arbitration awards, thereby inviting further
judicial activism of the worst sort. Such activism is particularly inappro-
priate here, since the starting point in this area of law is one of judicial
nonintervention.
VI. THE THREAT TO THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
One might attempt to defend an expansive public policy exception
on the ground that, under the common law of contracts, the courts
"tended to heed the axiom that 'whatever is injurious to the interests of
90. See supra note 86.
91. See infra section VI.
92. 736 F.2d at 825, quoted with approval in Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d at 1429. As noted earlier,
the Supreme Court rejected a "common sense" approach to the public policy exception in Misco. See
108 S. Ct. at 374.
93. 736 F.2d at 826.
94. 790 F.2d at 616.
95. .R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
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the public is void, on the grounds of public policy.' ",96 Judicial authority
to refuse to enforce contracts on such broad public policy grounds was
subject to a critical caveat, however; the legislature retained the ultimate
power to limit judicial discretion by defining what constitutes public pol-
icy. 97 Thus, the breadth of any public policy exception to the rule of
judicial nonintervention with respect to arbitration awards must be
viewed in light of the statutes governing labor relations in this country.98
When so viewed, it is difficult to believe that Congress envisioned the
"free-wheeling judicial exercises" 99 that the expansive public policy ex-
ception makes possible.
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, compels employers
and unions to negotiate collectively over all "mandatory" subjects of bar-
gaining. 00 These mandatory subjects are delineated generally in section
8(d) as "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." 1° 1 The Court has held, however, that Congress entrusted the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board with "the primary responsibility of
marking out the scope of the statutory language and of the statutory duty
to bargain. ' 10 2 In carrying out this responsibility, the Board determines
those subjects over which an employer is prohibited from taking unilat-
eral action during the course of the collective bargaining relationship. 103
96. 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1629 (3d ed. 1972); see also
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), cited in Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 373, and in W.R. Grace, 466 U.S. at
766; Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S. 74 (1916). But see Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 126, 197 (1844) ("courts are not at liberty ... to look at general considerations of the sup-
posed public interests and policy... beyond what [the] constitution and laws and judicial decisions
make known to us").
97. See, e.g., Chicago, B & Q R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 565 (1911) ("While the court,
unaided by legislative declaration and applying the principles of the common law, may uphold or
condemn contracts in the light of what is conceived to be public policy, its determination ... must
yield to the legislative will ...."); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340
(1897) ("when the law making power speaks upon a particular subject, over which it has constitu-
tional power to legislate, public policy in such a case is what the statute enacts").
98. See Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212, 220 (1983) ("[T]he relationship
... created by the collective-bargaining agreement ... [is not] a simple contract of hire governed by
traditional, common law principles.... Rather, it is an agreement creating relationships and inter-
ests under the federal common law of labor policy."); cf. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456 ("the sub-
stantive law to apply in suits under 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws").
99. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969).
100. See National Labor Relations Act, §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5),
158(b)(3), 158(d) (1982) [hereinafter NLRA]; NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
102. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 488 (1979).
103. See, e.g., NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736 (1962). Questions of waiver arising during the term of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment are beyond the scope of this article. Cf. Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the
Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23
(1985).
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A host of issues have been deemed to fall within the phrase "other
terms and conditions of employment." It is well settled, for example,
that plant rules,' 0 4 safety,10 5 discipline 0 6 (up to and including dis-
charge10 7), and grievance' 0 8 and arbitration procedures10 9  are all
mandatory subjects of bargaining. In negotiating over these subjects,
"Congress intended that the parties should have wide latitude ... , un-
restricted by any governmental power to regulate the substantive solu-
tion of their differences."" 0 This is consistent, of course, with the view
adopted in the Steelworkers Trilogy that issues relating to the workplace
that are not governed by statute or regulation are best left to private
negotiations between labor and management. The First, Fifth, Seventh
and Eighth Circuits - like their sister circuits - would certainly sub-
scribe to these black letter rules."' Yet, in embracing and applying an
expansive public policy exception, these courts seem oblivious to the fact
that their decisions lead to a de facto evisceration of the cardinal public
policy embodied in these rules - the duty to bargain.
In Iowa Electric, for example, the union and the employer most
likely bargained over all of the mandatory subjects listed above. The col-
lective bargaining agreement eventually signed by the parties was quite
unremarkable in providing that an employee could not be discharged un-
less the company had "just cause," and that a discharged employee was
entitled to a hearing before a neutral arbitrator to determine whether this
standard had been met. Equally unremarkable is what the agreement did
not contain. There was no provision mandating discharge for breaches
of specific company rules relating to safety. Similarly, the employer con-
ceded that there was no provision limiting the jurisdiction of the arbitra-
tor in reviewing disciplinary penalties. The parties had therefore agreed
that questions involving safety warranted no special treatment, and were
fully amenable to the arbitration procedures set forth in the agree-
104. See, e.g., Schraffts Candy Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 581 (1979).
105. See, e.g., Armour Oil Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1981); Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 225
N.L.R.B. 824 (1976), afld without opinion, 562 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1977).
106. See, e.g., Robbins Door & Sash Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 659 (1982); Kroehler Mfg. Co., 222
N.L.R.B. 1269 (1976).
107. See, e.g., Sorrento Hotel, 266 N.L.R.B. 350 (1983).
108. See, e.g., Peerless Foods Prods., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 161 (1978); Crown Coach Corp., 155
N.L.R.B. 625 (1965).
109. See, e.g., NLRB v. Independent Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443 (8th Cir.), cert. denied., 444 U.S.
829 (1979).
110. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960); see also H.K. Porter Co.
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
111. With some exceptions beyond the scope of this article, these general principles also apply
under the Railway Labor Act and a number of other statutes governing collective bargaining.
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ment.1 12 Framing the agreement in this way was unquestionably lawful
under existing law. That Congress would leave important safety issues
not governed by statute or regulation to private negotiations was implicit
in Misco, where the Court recognized that "[tlhe issue of safety in the
workplace is a commonplace issue for arbitrators to consider."11 3 The
Court in Misco merely acknowledged that it is well established under the
NLRA that safety is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 114
In ordering the reinstatement of an employee who was discharged
for deliberately defeating the interlock system of the secondary contain-
ment area, the Iowa Electric arbitrator "read" the contract to provide
that the company was not entitled to take that action under the specific
circumstances presented. The Eighth Circuit conceded that this "read-
ing" drew its essence from the contract when it stated that "the arbitra-
tor's authority is not disputed." 15 It nonetheless vacated the arbitrator's
award. The court decided, in effect, that the parties - who employed an
arbitrator merely to give content and meaning to their contract - had
reached an impermissible agreement with regard to this safety issue. The
court reached this result even though the safety issue in question, not to
mention the entire grievance and arbitration system, were mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, and even though there was nothing un-
lawful about the parties' agreement.
In practical terms, the court's decision licenses the employer to take
unilateral action with respect to this safety issue. Henceforth, the em-
ployer is virtually free to fire any employee who threatens the integrity of
the secondary containment system, confident of the fact that it will likely
prevail in court if an arbitrator rules that it did not have "just cause."
The employer will know that the Eighth Circuit and the district courts in
that jurisdiction are obliged to follow the precedent set in Iowa Elec-
112. See generally Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, No. C 85-0135 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 11, 1987).
113. 108 S. Ct. at 374 n. I1 (emphasis added). For this reason, the Court stated in Misco:
Had the arbitrator found that Cooper had possessed drugs on the property, yet imposed
discipline short of discharge because he found as a factual matter that Cooper could be
trusted not to use them on the job, the Court of Appeals could not upset the award because
of its own view that public policy about plant safety was threatened.
Id. at 374; see also Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368, 379 (1974) (arbitration process is as
"applicable to labor disputes touching the safety of the employees as to other varieties of disagree-
ment"); Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 81 ("The fact that the arbitration touches on issues related to
airline safety is irrelevant. There have been numerous arbitrations under the [Railway Labor Act]
involving grievances that implicate safety issues, and no court has ever ruled that an arbitral board
lacked jurisdiction to consider such issues.").
114. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("the conditions of a person's employment ... most obviously [include the] safety practices .. .
observed"); supra note 105.
115. 834 F.2d at 1427.
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tric. 1 6 Likewise, if an arbitrator sustains a discharge, the union will not
be foolish enough to challenge the decision in court, for it knows, too, of
the binding effect of Iowa Electric. In short, the employer is no longer
strictly bound by the duty to bargain over grievance and arbitration pro-
cedures as they relate to this safety issue. The relevant language in the
collective bargaining agreement is thus rendered meaningless.
The irony inherent in this scenario is readily apparent. Imagine that,
during the initial negotiations over the collective bargaining agreement,
the employer had refused to bargain over the disciplinary penalty to be
imposed for employees who defeat the interlock system, because it be-
lieved that this should always constitute grounds for automatic dis-
charge. By refusing to bargain over what clearly is a mandatory subject,
the employer would have committed an unfair labor practice and the
Board would have issued a bargaining order if the union had challenged
the employer's intransigence. But after Iowa Electric, the employer is
able to achieve during the term of the collective bargaining agreement
that which it could not achieve at the outset - an unfettered right (at-
tained outside of collective bargaining) to discharge employees who
breach the interlock system in the secondary containment area.
By contrast, imagine that the employer decides after its victory in
Iowa Electric that discharge is too harsh a punishment for first-time vio-
lators of the rules governing the interlock system, and agrees to new con-
tract terms that explicitly provide that such offenders will only be subject
to corrective discipline, in the form of a long suspension without pay.
Like the original contract arrangements, this new provision would be en-
tirely lawful under the NLRA. It would, however, appear to be inconsis-
tent with Iowa Electric, which can be said to stand for the proposition
that not firing an employee who defeats the interlock system is contrary
to the public policy favoring the strict observance of safety regulations at
nuclear power plants. The court would have to reach this result, since
there is no analytical difference between an agreement that expressly de-
lineates specific discipline for specific conduct, and an agreement that an
arbitrator "reads" to provide the same thing. The irony here is that the
court will never have the opportunity to enforce this result, since neither
the employer, nor the union, nor any third party will have a cause of
action when the employer complies with the new agreement. The agree-
ment would thus continue in force despite the fact that the Eighth Cir-
116. In light of the fact that the employer may have plants in other circuits, the nature of its




cuit has held it inconsistent with public policy to employ someone who
breaches the interlock system. Similarly, if under the agreement origi-
nally in place the employer had decided to retain the employee who de-
feated the interlock system, or had decided not to seek judicial review of
the award ordering his reinstatement, these decisions would stand un-
challenged. Once again, no one would have a cause of action to compel
the company to fire the employee, notwithstanding the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Iowa Electric.
The result is that, under a decision like the one rendered in Iowa
Electric, the employer is left holding all the cards. If, on the one hand, it
wishes to retain an employee who defeats the interlock system, the courts
cannot "stand in the way." ' 1 7 If, on the other hand, it wishes to ignore a
contractual provision requiring it to retain an employee, or a "just cause"
provision requiring it to submit grievances over safety-related discharges
to binding arbitration, it will find relief in the courts in the Eighth Cir-
cuit. Employers are thus permitted to take unilateral action that was
once considered impermissible, regardless of their statutory obligations
or the terms of the collective bargaining agreements they signed. Need-
less to say, whether or not the union gave up something in return for the
employer's original promise to submit safety-related discharges to arbi-
tration under the "just cause" provision is implicitly deemed irrele-
vant.118 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit and courts of a similar bent
have failed to recognize that they have effectively assumed a responsibil-
ity long held to be within the domain of the Board - that of deciding
which aspects of the employment relationship are truly mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. Remarkably, for all their discussion of public policies
such as safety, honesty, and the prompt delivery of the mails, these
courts neglect to ask whether their decisions conflict with the critical
public policy embodied in the duty to bargain.1 19
One should not conclude from this that employers are helpless to
prevent the reinstatement of employees they deem undesirable under a
117. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 790 F.2d at 619 (Easterbrook, J.,. concurring).
118. Obviously, these problems could not arise under the narrow interpretation of the public
policy exception, since there is no duty to bargain over contract terms which violate positive law or
compel conduct that does the same. The NLRA "does not grant the parties to a collective-bargain-
ing agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 212 (1985).
119. In Professional Adm'rs Ltd. v. Kopper-Glo Fuel, Inc., 819 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1987), an
arbitrator permitted pension plan trustees to increase unilaterally the employer's required contribu-
tions. The Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the award because the trustees had impermissibly taken
action with respect to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Although the court did not
address the scope of the public policy exception, its decision is one of few that focuses on the fact
that the duty to bargain is the important public policy at stake.
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narrow public policy exception. Quite the contrary, an employer is free
to return to the bargaining table when its current agreement expires and
obtain modifications that facilitate its desires. The nuclear power plant
operator in Iowa Electric could seek an agreement that provides that
breaches of the interlock system constitute grounds for automatic dis-
charge. Similarly, the agreement could be modified to limit the authority
of the arbitrator to review disciplinary penalties in cases involving safety
issues. The employer could even bargain to remove the application of all
safety-related questions from the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The em-
ployer could also refuse to hire arbitrators it deems unfit. As the
Supreme Court has noted, an employer is "always free to choose an arbi-
trator whose knowledge and judgment [it] trust[s]." 120 In addition, the
employer could lobby the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to change the
industry's mandatory employment standards, or it could seek direct re-
lief from Congress. Congress (and the state legislatures) have shown
themselves perfectly able to pass laws regulating employment in many
industries, both private and public. There are innumerable licensing and
certification requirements contained in the nation's statutes and regula-
tions, particularly in the transportation industry, and there is nothing to
stop Congress (and the state legislatures) from adding more if they so
desire. Congressional relief could also come in the form of a change in
the statutorily-mandated duty to bargain. But, in the absence of any of
these internal or external limitations on the arbitrator's ability to weigh
the merits of the employer's disciplinary action, the employer and the
union should be bound by the arbitrator's decision.
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
At this point, the future of the public policy exception is uncertain.
Two weeks after the Supreme Court decided Misco, and on the same day
the Eighth Circuit decided Iowa Electric, the Court granted certiorari in
United States Postal Service v. National Association of Letter Carriers,'
21
yet another case involving the public policy exception. There, a postal
employee was discharged shortly after being arrested for unlawfully de-
laying the delivery of the mails. He later pled guilty and was sentenced
to eighteen months probation. The employee's union grieved his dismis-
sal under the "just cause" provision of the applicable collective bargain-
ing agreement. When the parties were unable to settle the grievance, it
120. Gateway Coal Co., 414 U.S. at 379.
121. 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987); see supra note
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was submitted to an arbitrator, who ordered that the employee be rein-
stated without back pay upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. 122
Although the employee satisfied the conditions established by the
arbitrator, the Postal Service refused to reinstate him. Instead, it suc-
ceeded in having the District Court vacate the arbitrator's award solely
on the ground that it was contrary to public policy. In reversing that
decision, the District of Columbia Circuit first noted that, under its pre-
vious decisions in American Postal Workers Union123 and Northwest Air-
lines v. Air Line Pilots Association International,124 the public policy
exception must be construed in an "extremely narrow" fashion. 125 The
court then enforced the award in question because there was no legal
prohibition against the employee's reinstatement. It thus rejected the
Postal Service's invitation to have it " 'impose [its] own brand of justice'
by holding that reinstatement" was "inconsistent with the public's inter-
est in an efficient and reliable postal service."'
126
There are several reasons why the Supreme Court may have taken
this case for review. One possibility is that the Court wishes to put a stop
to open-ended applications of the public policy exception exemplified by
cases like Iowa Electric. Adopting a narrow interpretation of the public
policy exception would be entirely consistent with the rationale, disposi-
tion and tenor of Misco, and would require the Court merely to adopt the
bright-line rule set forth in the last footnote of that opinion:
[A] court may refuse to enforce an award on public policy grounds
only when the award itself violates a statute, regulation, or other mani-
festation of positive law, or compels conduct by the employer that
would violate such a law.
12 7
Unfortunately, the Court did not find occasion to reach the merits of this
bright-line rule because other notable deficiencies in the Fifth Circuit's
decision allowed it to dispose of the case on different grounds.1 28
Although vote-counting is always a murky business, there would appear
to be at least four votes for the bright-line rule in United States Postal
122. The employee was to be reinstated after a 60-day medical leave upon demonstrating that he
had regularly attended and had fully participated in Gamblers Anonymous meetings, that he had
not gambled and that he was physically able to return to work. See 810 F.2d at 1240 n.3.
123. 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see supra note 57.
124. 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3678 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1987)
(No. 86-1548); see surpa note 57.
125. United States Postal Service, 810 F.2d at 1241.
126. Id. at 1241-42 (quoting American Postal Workers Union, 789 F.2d at 8) (brackets in
original).
127. 108 S. Ct. at 374 n.12. If the Court were to embrace this narrow interpretation of the
public policy exception, there is no reason to think that it would only consider relevant whether the
employer, but not the union or employees, is compelled to violate positive law.
128. See id. at 375-76 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
[Vol. 64:3
REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
Service. Justice Blackmun (the author of W.R. Grace and the concur-
rence in Misco), Justice Brennan (who joined the concurrence in Misco)
and Justice Marshall (the author of Otis Elevator years ago) would seem
strongly in favor of the narrow interpretation of the public policy excep-
tion. And Justice White, who did everything but adopt this bright-line
rule in writing for a unanimous Court in Misco, could be expected to
agree.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, indicated that he might not sub-
scribe to the bright-line rule when he granted the Postal Service's appli-
cation to stay the court of appeals' mandate in United Sates Postal Service
pending disposition of the petition for certiorari. 129 In his brief opinion,
which was issued before the Court heard oral arguments in Misco, the
Chief Justice argued that the two cases were distinguishable:
Although [Misco] presents the [public policy] issue in the context of a
private employer, [the Postal Service] presents a stronger case for set-
ting aside the arbitrator's award because it operates under a statutory
mandate to ensure prompt delivery of the mails.' 30
The Chief Justice further alleged that reinstatement would "seriously im-
pair" the Postal Service's "ability to impress the seriousness of [its] mis-
sion upon its workers."'' 31
The Chief Justice's position appears to embrace false dichotomies.
To begin with, there is nothing in the nation's labor laws or the Court's
previous decisions to support the proposition that the judiciary should be
more solicitous of public policy claims when the Postal Service seeks re-
view of arbitration awards. Indeed, collective bargaining for postal em-
ployees is governed by the same statute (i.e., the NLRA) and the same
duty to bargain applicable in Misco. 132 Therefore, even though the Pos-
tal Service is a quasi-public employer, there is no principled way to dis-
tinguish it from the employer in Misco with respect to judicial deference
to arbitration awards.
The Court has been offered a further opportunity to differentiate
among types of employers in Northwest Airlines, where the carrier ap-
pears to argue in its petition for certiorari that airline arbitration awards
are somehow different because the airline industry is heavily regulated
and involves public safety. 13 3 If this view is adopted along with the Chief
129. United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 107 S. Ct. 2094 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice 1987).
130. Id. at 2095.
131. Id.
132. See infra note 137.
133. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n
Int'l (No. 86-1548). In Northwest, the carrier discharged a first officer who had violated a company
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Justice's proposal in United States Postal Service, the Court will effec-
tively endorse a sliding scale, where the level of judicial deference to an
arbitator's award would depend upon the type of employer involved.
Purely private and purely public employers would be on the ends of the
scale with regulated private industries somewhere in between. Such a
scale would certainly be unmanageable and, moreover, unwarranted,.
since it would ultimately derive solely from the Court's view of the im-
portance of the alleged public policy at stake.
It adds nothing to the analysis to point out that an employer func-
tions under a statutory mandate. The employer in Misco had a statutory
obligation to provide a safe working environment, and it cited a provision
of the Occupational Health and Safety Act to this effect in a brief submit-
ted to the Court. 134 The Court rejected this specious line of argument,
no doubt because the asserted connection between Cooper's reinstate-
ment and the safety of the workplace was "tenuous at best."135 Likewise,
the argument that the Postal Service's obligation to deliver the mails
promptly will be compromised in some significant way by a decision sim-
ply to reinstate an employee, even one who once delayed the mails,
"rest[s] on [nothing] more than speculation or assumption"'' 36 about the
employee's future behavior. Nearly every employer in the country oper-
ates under one or more federal or state statutory mandates, and it is not
for the courts to decide which ones are "important" and which ones are
not.
There is one statutory mandate, however, that is directly applicable
in the review of arbitration awards, but is somehow overlooked by courts
like the Eighth Circuit. This mandate, expressed in no uncertain terms
in the NLRA, provides that employers and unions are to make their own
arrangements regarding any aspect of the employment relationship sub-
ject to the duty to bargain, and that the Government (including the
courts) should not interfere with their bargained-for agreement unless it
is clearly illegal. 37 In other words, "when neither the collective-bar-
rule prohibiting the consumption of alcohol within 24 hours of flight duty. A panel of the Northwest
Airlines System Board of Adjustment reinstated him without backpay or benefits, but only on the
condition that the Federal Air Surgeon certify that he had recovered from the effects of his alcohol-
ism, including total abstinence for at least two years. The District of Columbia Circuit enforced the
award on the ground that there was no legal prohibition against the rehiring of a recovered alcoholic.
The court noted, in addition, that "[iut would be the height of judicial chutzpah for [the court] to
second-guess the present judgment of the FAA recertifying [the employee] for flight duty." 808 F.2d
at 83.
134. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 8-9, Misco (No. 86-651).
135. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 374.
136. Id.
137. Since Congress incorporated the NLRA, with minor exceptions not applicable here, into
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gaining process nor its end product violates any command of Congress, a
federal court has no authority to modify the substantive terms of a collec-
tive-bargaining contract."138 Thus, when courts entertain public policy
claims, the proper question to ask is whether the statutory mandate ex-
pressed in the nation's employment laws will be compromised by a deci-
sion to vacate an arbitral award. If courts continue to overturn awards
merely because they believe that some other, unrelated statutory man-
date they deem important is threatened, judicial deference to arbitration
will become a distant memory.
This problem will be avoided if the Court adopts the bright-line rule
proposed in the last footnote in Misco when deciding United States Postal
Service. Only this rule is consonant with the public policies that inform
the NLRA. The lower courts will not be deprived of their public policy
powers, of course, if the Court were to follow this recommended course.
They will still retain the authority to find an arbitrator's award contrary
to public policy when the arbitrator construes the collective bargaining
agreement in a way that compels the violation of positive law. For exam-
ple, if an arbitrator requires "closed shop" or "hot cargo" arrangements
that violate the NLRA, the award should be vacated. 139 A similar result
would be reached if, for example, an arbitrator reinstates a school bus
driver who is fired after it is discovered that he had no driver's license.
An arbitrator cannot override state law that positively prohibits unli-
censed persons from driving a school bus. Likewise, in Northwest Air-
lines, the arbitrator could not have compelled the reinstatement of the
pilot if the FAA had refused to recertify him for flight duty. 140 These are
legitimate examples of the public policy exception.
In United States Postal Service, Congress could have prohibited the
Postal Service from employing a postal carrier who has been convicted of
delaying the mails. However, Congress did not do this. Instead, it sim-
ply passed a law making it a crime to delay the mails. This suggests that
Congress believed that criminal punishment would be sufficient, and that
persons who violate the mail statutes should not also be deprived of fu-
the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, this mandate is applicable to the Postal Service. See 39
U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970).
138. UMWA Health & Retirement Funds v, Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 576 (1982).
139. Cf. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983) (vacating award that ordered reinstatement of worker
whose employment was barred by federal statute); General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v.
Standard Brands, 579 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979)
(award required employer to give employees displaced at one plant superseniority at another plant
where different union was the certified bargaining agent, in violation of the NLRA).
140. See supra note 133.
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ture employment in order to send an even stronger message to other
employees.
The danger posed by an expansive public policy exception is not just
that it will be regularly abused by judges who are anxious to impose their
own "self-mesmerized views of economic and social theory,"1 4' thus un-
dercutting the duty to bargain. An ill-defined exception will also en-
courage employers to resort to litigation as a regular course when faced
with awards they do not like. Even if an employer knows that a particu-
lar public policy challenge is unwinnable, it can achieve substantial delay
in implementing an award if it knows that the courts are generally solici-
tous of public policy claims. 142 Arbitral finality will thus be significantly
reduced, t43 and unions will know that they will ultimately have to resort
to strikes and other forms of economic warfare to settle their grievances.
This would greatly disserve unions, employers and the public at large.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An expansive publid policy exception is a mischievous weapon in the
hands of a judge determined to implement his or her own brand of indus-
trial justice. Any result-oriented judge who has a modicum of intelli-
gence can find a perceived conflict between an arbitrator's award and the
judge's own notions of public policy. If enough judges take this course,
the Supreme Court's mandate of judicial deference to arbitration will be
substantially eroded, if not destroyed. At the same time, certain
mandatory subjects will be removed from the ambit of collective bargain-
ing, thus eroding the duty to bargain as well. This surely is not what
Congress had in mind in enacting the nation's labor laws, nor is it what
the Court had in mind in deciding the Steelworkers Trilogy, W.R. Grace
and Misco. By endorsing the narrow view of the public policy exception,
the Court will emphasize once again that binding, final arbitration "fur-
thers the national labor policy of peaceful resolution of labor disputes
and thus best accords with the parties' presumed objectives in pursing
collective bargaining." 144
141. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969).
142. See Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 768 F.2d 180, 188 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1010 (1986) ("some companies nowadays are trying to reduce the credibility of unions by drag-
ging out the grievance process through challenges in court to arbitration awards").
143. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599 ("plenary review by a court of the merits would make
meaningless the provisions that the arbitrator's decision is final, for in reality it would almost never
be final"); cf. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation: Reflections of a Judge, in ARB3-
TRATION 1982, CONDUCT OF THE HEARING 16, Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting,
National Academy of Arbitrators (1983).
144. Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1984).
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